Abstract Identification of discrete outcome models is often established by using special covariates that have full support. This paper shows how these identification results can be extended to a large class of commonly used semiparametric discrete outcome models when all covariates are bounded. I apply the proposed methodology to multinomial choice models, bundles models, and finite games of complete information.
Introduction
Covariates that have full support (i.e., supported on the whole Euclidean space) provide an elegant and powerful approach for establishing identification in many discrete outcome models.
1 Existence of such covariates is often necessary for nonparametric identification of distributions of latent variables.
2 "Identification-at-infinity"
arguments are based on existence of covariates with full support. 3 However, finding such covariates in applied work is often problematic.
In this paper, I show that common parametric assumptions about the distribution of some unobservables (e.g. one normally distributed random coefficient in a model with multiple random coefficients) can fully restore the identification power of covariates with full support, even if covariates are in fact bounded. I provide two results connecting semiparametric discrete outcome models with covariates that have bounded support and (non)parametric discrete outcome models with special covariates that have full support. The first result is general and can be applied to a large class of semiparametric models. However, it requires a preliminary identification of a finite-dimensional parameter by using some auxiliary arguments. The second result does not require any extra identification steps, and uses one of the most popular parametrizations in applied work -the Gaussian distribution. I apply the proposed approaches to three well-known models: multinomial choice models with random coefficients, bundles models, and finite games of complete information.
The results of this paper rest on two commonly used assumptions. First, I assume existence of excluded (special) covariates that affect the distribution over outcomes via a latent index. Second, I impose commonly used parametric restrictions on the distribution of this index (e.g., the Gumbel or the Gaussian distribution). If the distribution of the index is sufficiently "rich", then I show how to identify the 1 See, for example, Manski (1985) , Matzkin (1992) , Ichimura and Thompson (1998) , Lewbel (1998) , Lewbel (2000) , Tamer (2003) , Matzkin (2007) , Berry and Haile (2009) , Bajari et al. (2010) , Gautier and Kitamura (2013) , Fox and Gandhi (2016) , Dunker et al. (2017) , Fox and Lazzati (2017) , and Fox et al. (2018) .
2 Full support assumption is not necessary if it is assumed that latent variables have bounded support. In this case the support of the special covariates have to be large enough to cover the support of unobservables.
3 For example, Manski (1988) , Heckman (1990), and Tamer (2003) .
distribution over outcomes conditional on the realization of the observed covariates and the latent index. Since the index distribution is usually assumed to have full support, I can treat the latent index as observed covariate with full support and apply any identification technique that requires existence of such covariates. The index has different interpretation in different settings. For instance, in random coefficients model one of the random coefficients can be treated as the latent index. In games, the role of the index is played by a component of random utilities corresponding to different outcomes. "Richness" of the latent index distribution is formalized by a notion of bounded completeness. This paper also contributes to the literature on partially identified models. I show that in many partially identified models the identified sets are "thin" in the following sense. The model parameters (including infinite-dimensional ones) are identified up to a finite-dimensional parameter of a lower dimension. This finding may lead to substantial computational gains in constructing confidence sets for partially identified parameters (e.g. Chen et al. (2011) ) and sheds some light on the properties of identified sets in these models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating example. In Section 3 I describe the setting and derive general identification results. Section 4 specializes the results from Section 3 for widely used normally distributed latent variables. In Sections 5 I apply the result from Section 3 to three different discrete outcome models. Section 6 concludes. All proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Motivating Example: Binary Choice
Consider a simple single agent binary choice problem.
5 A utility maximizing agent has to choose y ∈ Y = {0, 1}. The utility of alternative y = 0 is normalized to 0. The utility of option y = 1 is
Random variables v 1 and g 1 represent the random slope coefficient corresponding to covariate z 2,1 ∈ Z 2,1 ⊆ R and the random intercept, respectively. The objective of the econometrician is to recover the c.d.f. of g 1 , F g 1 , from observed distribution of choices y and covariates z. Typically it is assumed that v 1 = 1 a.s., and z 2,1 and g 1 are independent. In this case the main identifying conditions is Pr(y = 1|z 2,1 = z 2,1 ) = 1 − F g 1 (−z 2,1 ), for all z 2,1 ∈ Z 2,1 . Hence, if g 1 is supported on R, then nonparametric identification of its distribution can be achieved if and only if z 2,1 has full support. Next I will show how another commonly used assumption about v 1 can lead to identification of F g 1 even if all observed covariates have bounded support. Assume that there exists a covariate z 1 ∈ Z 1 ⊆ R such that for z = (z 1 , z 2,1 )
where β 1 = 0 and N(µ, σ 2 ) denotes the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . For this section only I assume that β = (β 0 , β 1 ) T is known or can be identified. Later on I will show how one can pointidentify β. Assuming that g 1 is independent 5 Throughout the paper, deterministic vectors and functions are denoted by lower-case regular font Latin letters (e.g., x), random objects by bold letters (e.g., x). Capital letters are used to denote supports of random variables (e.g., x ∈ X). I denote the support of a conditional distribution of x conditional on z = z by X z . Also, given a family x = (x k ) k∈K and a particular index value k ∈ K, I use the notation
) of x and x|z = z, respectively. of z and v 1 , we can rewrite (1) as
where e 1 is a standard normal random variable that is independent of z.
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The key step is to show that we can identify
for all v 1 ∈ R and z ∈ Z. If we can identify Pr(y = 1|z = ·, v 1 = ·), then we can analyze the model as if v 1 is observed. In this case z 2,1 v 1 becomes an observed special covariate with full support since v 1 is supported on R. By using variation in v 1 we can recover F g 1 even if the support of z is bounded. In other words, the above binary choice model with just one normally distributed random slope coefficient with bounded covariates, in terms of identification features, is equivalent to the binary choice model where the utility from choosing y = 1 is equal to
where r 1 and g 1 are independent, and r 1 is observed covariate supported on
It is left to show that Pr(y = 1|z = z, v 1 = ·) can be identified. First, note that under independence condition
Second, note that for any fixed z 2,1 we have the following integral equation
for all z 1 ∈ Z 1 . Since variation in z 1 does not affect Pr(y = 1|z 2,1 = z 2,1 , v 1 = ·), we can use this variation to identify it. In other words, if the family of normal 6 Assumption that the variance of e 1 is 1 is a scale normalization.
distributions {φ(· − β 0 − β 1 z 1 ) : z 1 ∈ Z 1 } is sufficiently "rich", then the integral equation has a unique solution. For discrete distributions the "richness" condition is usually characterized by the rank condition. For continuous distributions the "richness" condition is associated with a notion of "completeness". In our example, the "completeness" condition is satisfied since the family of {φ(· − β 0 − β 1 z 1 ) :
7 Since the choice of z 2,1 was arbitrary, we recover Pr(y = 1|z 2,1 = ·, v 1 = ·) and thus can work with well-known model (2).
Two important assumptions needed for the result to hold are: (i) existence of a parametric index v 1 such that the choices are affected by some excluded covariates only through the index; and (ii) the distribution of the index conditional on excluded covariates is sufficiently rich (complete). The rest of the paper generalizes these key assumptions to environments with multiple agents and outcomes, and establishes identification of β.
General Model
Each instance of the environment is characterized by an endogenous outcome y from a known finite set Y , a vector of observed exogenous characteristics
T , and a vector of unobserved structural variables v ∈ V ⊆ R dv . 8 It is assumed that the econometrician observes the joint distribution of (y, x T ) T .
Assumption 1 (Exclusion
Assumption 1 is an exclusion restriction that requires covariates z to affect distribution over some outcomes only via the distribution of the latent v. Note that the exclusion restriction does not need to be imposed on all outcomes. For instance, in single agent decision models one can identify the payoff parameters by observing only the probability of choosing the outside option (e.g., Thompson (1989) and Lewbel (2000) ). Assumption 1 does not rule out existence of other latent variables (different from v) since exclusion restrictions are imposed on the distribution over outcomes conditional on x = x and v = v.
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The next assumption is a parametric restriction on the latent variable whose distribution is affected by the excluded covariates z.
Completeness assumptions have been widely used in econometric analysis. Completeness is typically imposed on the distribution of observables (e.g. Newey and Powell (2003)). However, many commonly used parametric restrictions on the distribution of unobservables imply Assumption 2. For instance, it is satisfied for the Gaussian distribution and the Gumbel distribution.
is known for every y ∈ Y * and x ∈ X.
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, h 0 is identified from µ up to F v|x .
Proposition 3.1 implies that under exclusion restrictions if one assumes that the latent variable has a known distribution belonging to a boundedly complete family, then one can work with the model as if the realizations of latent variables are observed in the data since we can identify h 0 (y, w, ·) = Pr(y = y|w = w, v = ·). Thus, if I 9 I consider a model with unobserved heterogeneity that is not fully captured by v in Section 5.1. 10 For testability of the completeness assumptions see Canay et al. (2013) .
know or can identify F v|x (see Section 4), for identification I can interpret latent variables (v) as observed covariates. If these latent variables have full support (e.g. normal errors), then all identification techniques that require existence of covariates with full support can be applied (e.g., Fox and Gandhi (2016) in the context of random coefficients model and Bajari et al. (2010) in the context of games). In other words, I can transform a model with covariates that have bounded support into the model with covariates that have full support, and then use existing methods to identify different objects of interest.
The following example demonstrates how knowing h 0 can help to identify some underlying aspects of the model.
Assume that γ(w) + v represents the utility agent gets from choosing y = 1, where γ is some unknown function of w. Assume, moreover, that the utility from choosing y = 0 is normalized to zero. The identified h 0 is consistent with the utility maximizing behavior if and only if
for almost all v ∈ V and w ∈ W . Thus, if V = R, then one can test for utility maximizing behavior, and can identify γ(·) if the agent maximizes utility.
Proposition 3.1 establishes identification of h 0 only up to F v|x . Typically F v|x is known up to a finite-dimensional parameter. In Section 4 I show how one can identify this parameter and thus h 0 if F v|x is assumed to be the Gaussian distribution. In Section 5.3 I show how Proposition 3.1 can be used to characterize the identified set of a partially identified game of complete information.
Gaussian Distribution
Proposition 3.1 can be applied with any known parametric distribution F v|x as long as the family of the distributions generated by the variation in excluded covariates is complete. The most prominent example of such families is the exponential family of distributions. In this section I specialize the results from the previous section to probably one of the most common parametrization in applied work -Gaussian errors. I show how to identify F v|x for such models. The following assumption is sufficient for Assumption 2 to hold.
Assumption 3
(i) The latent v satisfies
where β 0,i (·) and
..,dv are independent identically distributed standard normal random variables that are independent of x;
(iii) For every w ∈ W the support of z|(w = w), Z w , contains an open ball;
(iv) The sign of either β 0,i (w) or β 1,i (w) is known for every w ∈ W and i.
Assumption 3(i) is motivated by random coefficient models. The covariate z 2,i can be interpreted as choice ("product") specific characteristic. The random coefficients [β 0,i (w) + β 1,i (w)z 1,i + e i ] captures agent specific heterogeneity in tastes. The only support restriction is imposed on z (Assumption 3(iii)). Non of the covariates are assumed to have full or unbounded support. Assumptions 3(i)-(iii) are sufficient for Assumption 2 since the family of normal distributions indexed by the mean parameter is complete as long as the parameter space for the mean parameter contains an open ball.
Assumptions 3(iv) is a normalization. It requires that either the sign of the marginal effect of z 1,i or the sign of the intercept (as long at it is not equal to zero) are known (or can be identified). In discrete outcome models with almost surely unique equilibrium (e.g. multinomial choice) the sign of β 1,i (·) can often be identified because of monotonicity of h in utility indexes v. For instance, in multinomial choice models the probability of choosing an outside option is decreasing in mean utilities of other choices. Without additional restrictions the sign can not be identified as the following example demonstrates. T . Take y ∈ Y * and note that
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of φ(·) and the third equality follows from the change of variables. Hence, if h 0 and (β 0,1 , β 1,1 ) T can generate the data, thenh 0 and (−β 0,1 , −β 1,1 )
T such thath 0 (y, v) = h 0 (y, −v) for all y and v can generate the data too. Proposition 3.1 only identifies h 0 up to the distribution of unobservables. In particular, under Assumption 3, h 0 is identified up to {β 0,i (·),
. The following assumption allows us to identify the distribution of unobservables and thus h 0 .
Let
Assumption 4 For every w ∈ W and i = 1, 2, . . . , d y , there exists y * ∈ Y * and z 2,i ∈ Z 2,i|w \ {0} such that η(·) is neither an exponential nor an affine function of z 1,i .
Assumption 4 means that if we fix all covariates but one, then the probability of observing one excluded outcome conditional on covariates is neither affine nor exponential function of the non-fixed covariate. Assumption 4 is not very restrictive since it rules out only some exponential and linear probability models. Moreover, it is testable. 
are identified.
Proposition 4.1 establishes identification of h 0 and F v|x for normally distributed latent variables. Next I will show how one can use h 0 in different discrete outcome models.
Applications

Multinomial Choice
Consider the following random coefficients model. The agent has to choose between J inside goods and an outside option of no purchase. That is, y ∈ Y = {0, 1, . . . , J}. I normalize the utility from alternative y = 0 to 0. The random utility from choosing an alternative y = 0 is of the form
The random coefficient β 0 (w) + β 1 (w)z 1 + e 1 represents individual specific heterogeneous tastes associated with product characteristic z 2,y . The latent random vector g = (g y ) y∈Y \{0} captures other sources of unobserved heterogeneity which are different from β 0 (w) + β 1 (w)z 1 + e 1 . The observed covariates are
where z 2 = (z 2,y ) y∈Y \{0} . Assume that the agents are utility maximizers.
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Assumption 5 (i) e 1 is an independent of (g T , x T ) T standard normal random variable;
(ii) β 1 (w) = 0 a.s.;
(iii) For every w ∈ W the support of z|w = w, Z w , contains an open ball.
Similarly to the existing treatment of random coefficients model, I assume that the random coefficients in front of z 2,y are the same for each alternative y.
14 However, I do not impose sign restrictions on β 0 (w) + β 1 (w)z 1 + e 1 . Note that
where Φ(·) is the standard normal c.d.f. Thus, since there are no restrictions on β 0 (·), the random coefficient β 0 (w) + β 1 (w)z 1 + e 1 can be positive (negative) with probability that is arbitrarily close to 1.
Assumption 6
(i) Random shocks g are conditionally independent of z conditional on w = w. That is, for all x = (z T , w
where F g|z,w (·|z, w) and F g|w (·|w) are conditional c.d.fs of g|z = z, w = w and g|w = w, respectively;
(ii) For every w ∈ W , there exists z 2 = 0 such that it is contained in Z 2|w with some open neighborhood and z 2,y = z 2,y ′ for any y, y ′ ∈ Y \ {0};
(iii) For every w ∈ W there exists z 2 ∈ Z 2|w such that Pr(y = 0|z 1 = ·, z 2 = z 2 , w = w) 13 The results below hold even if utility maximizing behavior is not assumed as long as Assumption 1 is satisfied for at least one outcome.
14 The model extends to the case when the random slope coeffcient is choice specific as in Assumption 3. But in this case one would need to find more excluded covariates.
is neither exponential nor affine function.
Assumption 6(i) together with utility maximizing behavior guarantees that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Assumption 6(i) is the only restriction on g. I allow g to be discrete or continuous random variable with unknown support. Assumptions 6(ii)-(iii) are testable restrictions. Assumptions 6(ii) imply that one can find z 2,1 = z 2,2 = · · · = z 2,J = 0 such that Assumption 2 is satisfied for v = z 2,1 (β 0 (w) + β 1 (w)z 1 + e 1 ). Assumption 6(iii) is sufficient for Assumption 4 to hold.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Then
(i) β 0 (·) and β 1 (·) are identified;
(ii) The above model inherits all identifying properties of the following random coefficients model:
where r = (r y ) y∈Y \{0} is an observed covariate independent of g = (g y ) y∈Y \{0} conditional on w with the conditional support
Proposition 5.1 implies that the original random coefficient model can be represented in the "special-covariate-with-full-support" framework without assuming existence of such covariates. Moreover, if the set of directions that z 2 / z 2 can cover is sufficiently rich, then R w = R J and all the identification results that require existence of special covariates with full support (e.g., Lewbel (2000) , Berry and Haile (2009) , and Fox and Gandhi (2016) ) can be applied. For instance, if {z 2 / z 2 : z 2 ∈ Z 2|w } is equal to a unit sphere in R J for every w, then R w = R J and I can nonparametrically identify F g|w .
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15 In general, I can identify F g|w (·|w) over R w only.
Bundles
Consider the following bundles model motivated by Gentzkow (2007) , Dunker et al. (2017) , and Fox and Lazzati (2017) . There are J goods and the agent can purchase any bundle consisting of these goods. The vector y describes the purchasing decision of the agent. That is, y ∈ Y = {0, 1}
J . For instance, y = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
T corresponds to the case when the agent purchased a bundle of goods 2 and 4. I normalize the utility from "not buying", y = 0, to 0. The random utility from choosing an alternative y = 0 is of the form
Although the model (4) looks similar to the model (3), there is one important difference: there is no bundle specific covariate since z 2,j affects not only the utility from buying good j alone, but also every bundle that includes it. 
Proposition 5.2 Suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Then
where r = (r j ) j=1,...,J is an observed covariate independent of g = (g y ) y∈Y \{0} conditional on w with the conditional support
Note that for J = 2 if one assumes that
where f i (·), i = 1, 2, 3, are some unknown functions, and (ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 , ξ) T ∈ R 2 × R + , then model (3) is equivalent to the one in Fox and Lazzati (2017) , and one can apply their Theorem 1 to identify f i (·), i = 1, 2, 3, and the distributions of ǫ i |w, i = 1, 2, and ξ|w.
Binary games of complete information
In the multinomial choice and the bundles models I am able to establish identification of the objects of interest without requiring covariates with full support. The example that is considered in this section is different: the model is not pointidentified. However, the Lebesgue measure of the identified set is zero. In particular, all parameters of the model are identified up to a finite-dimensional parameter of lower-dimension.
There are I < ∞ players indexed by i ∈ I. Every player must choose y i ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the outcome space is Y = {0, 1} I .
16 Players i's payoff from choosing action y i when the other agents are choosing y −i is given by
where e i , i ∈ I, are observed by players but unobserved by the econometrician shocks; α 0,i (·), β 0,i (·) and δ 0,i,j (·) are unknown functions. The econometrician observes a joint distribution of (y,
The following two assumptions are sufficient for Assumptions 1 and 2.
Assumption 7 (i) Assumption 1 is satisfied with v = (β 0,i (w)z i + e i ) i∈I ;
(ii) For every i, j ∈ I, i = j, the cardinality of
is at least 2.
Assumption 7(i) implies that excluded covariates affect the distribution of some outcomes via payoffs only. Assumption 7(ii) imposes restrictions on the set of those outcomes. If one thinks of an entry game where y i = 1 corresponds to the entry decision, the outcomes in Assumption 7(ii) have the following interpretation. Assumption 8 is a parametric restriction on the distribution of payoffs. It is satisfied by the parametrization used in Bajari et al. (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) .
I consider three complete information equilibrium/solution concepts: (i) minimax play, (ii) "collusive" behavior, and (iii) rationalizability. Under minimax solution concept every player picks the action that maximizes her minimum possible payoff. Under "collusive" behavior players play the outcome that maximizes the sum of individual profits. Under rationalizability players play any action that survives iterated strict dominance elimination. The most commonly used solution concept of Nash equilibrium is nested within rationalizability. Hence, all identification results that are derived under rationalizability are valid for Nash equilibrium (both in pure and mixed strategies). These three solution concepts have different implications for identification. For instance, in the two player case, if players display "collusive" behavior, then there is no hope of separate identification of "competition" effects δ 0,i,j . At best, one can identify δ 0,1,2 + δ 0,2,1 . Fortunately, it is possible to distinguish between these three models up to β 0 (·) since under Assumptions 7 and 8 I am able to nonparametrically recover h 0 up β 0 (·). Figure 1 illustrates predictions in a two player binary game for different realizations of v when δ 0,1,2 < 0 and δ 0,2,1 < 0. The thresholds a i , b i , c i , i = 1, 2, are determined by α 0,i and δ 0,i,j , i, j = 1, 2. If one can identify h 0 for two outcomes, say (0, 0) and (1, 1), then one can distinguish between all three equilibrium concepts as long as the following three conditions are satisfied.
Conditions (5)- (7) hold if δ 2 0,1,2 (w) = δ 2 0,2,1 (w) for some w ∈ W . Thus, if I can identify the correct solution concept, then I can recover the threshold values. For instance, if I know that agents play rationalizable strategies, then I can identifyã i ,b i , i = 1, 2. Sinceã i = −α 0,i , andb i = −α 0,i − δ 0,i,j , i, j = 1, 2, I also can identify α 0 and δ 0 .
The above intuition generalizes to games with more than two players, more than two actions, and without any sign restrictions on δ 0,i,j . The following result establishes identification in binary games. Proposition 5.3 states that if marginal effects of some excluded covariates on payoffs are known, then one can identify the solution concept, together with some (or sometimes all) payoff parameters. Assumption 8(i) implies that the errors in payoffs are not correlated. I can allow for unknown variance covariance matrix V . In this case all objects in Proposition 5.3 are identified up to β 0 (·) and V .
Full identification in this binary game can be achieved if one can identify β 0 (·). The standard identification-at-infinity argument requires existence of player-actionspecific covariates that have full support (unbounded from above and below). However, the full support assumption is only needed to separately identify the intercepts of the mean utilities (α 0 and δ 0 ). In contrast, in order to identify β 0 one only needs to have player-action-specific covariates with unbounded support (e.g., unbounded from above only).
17 In other words, full identification can be achieved in a substantially bigger set of applications (e.g., prices or income can potentially take arbitrary large positive values, but cannot be negative).
18
Conclusion
This paper shows that commonly used exclusion restrictions and parametric assumptions about the distribution of some unobservables may lead to identification in discrete outcome models. The proposed identification framework allows one to extend the results from a large literature that uses special covariates with full support to environments where such full-support covariates are not available.
The partial identification result can substantially decrease computational complexity of constructing confidence sets for partially identified parameters. For instance, the likelihood ratio statistic of Chen et al. (2011) is asymptotically χ 2 distributed after profiling β 0 under the null hypothesis, since the model in this case is identified. Thus, there is no need to use bootstrap and one can take critical values from χ 2 distribution. Mattner, L. et al. (1993) . Some incomplete but boundedly complete location families. A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Fix some y ∈ Y * and w ∈ W (for brevity I will drop w in the notation below). Under Assumption 1 I have the following integral equation
Suppose that there exists h with h(y
Which implies that the nonzero function h(y, ·)−h 0 (y, ·) integrates to 0 for all z ∈ Z ′ .
The latter contradicts to Assumption 2. The fact that the choice of y and w was arbitrary completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Note that Proposition 3.1 implies that h 0 is identified up to {β 0,i (·),
, and take y * from Assumption 4. To simplify notation let F 0 : R → R and η : R 2 → R such that
where φ(·) is the standard normal p.d.f., and η(z 1,i , z 2,i ) = µ(y * |z, w).
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that
After dropping index i from the notation and some rearrangements I get
Moreover, 
identifies the sign of β 1 (w) since F g|w (·|w) is weakly monotone. Thus, Assumption 3(iv) is also satisfied. Assumption 1 is satisfied for Y * = {0} and for h(0, w, v) = F g|w (v, v, ·, v|w) . Note that
Since assumption of Proposition 3.1 are satisfied I pointidentify
for all z 2 , w, v. Note that since v can take any value in R for any direction −z 2 / z 2 in the support of z 2 I can recover F g|w (g|w) for any g such that g = −z 2 v/ z 2 for some v ∈ R. That is, I identify F g|w (·|w) over the set
A.4. Proof of Proposition 5.3
First, I fix some w ∈ W and for notation simplicity I drop dependence on w. Since assumptions of Proposition 3.1 are satisfied, I identify
for all y ∈ Y * . Since v ∈ R I and v i enters only payoffs of player i, I can make a payoff of any player arbitrary small ("close" to −∞). Hence, under all solution concepts under consideration I can force any player to choose y i = 0. Take any two players i = j and consider
for all y ∈ Y * and v i , v j . Note that h 0,i,j corresponds to a two player binary game with payoffs
Moreover, by Assumption 7(ii), in this two player game at least two outcomes from for any α 0,1 , α 0,2 , δ 0,1,2 , and δ 0,2,1 , the predictions about outcomes (0, 0) and (1, 1) depending on the value of (v 1 , v 2 ) T ∈ R 2 can be depicted as in Figure 2 , where c 1 = −α 0,1 − min{δ 0,1,2 , 0} and c 2 = −α 0,2 − min{δ 0,2,1 , 0} Case 2. Suppose that agents are behaving according to "collusive" solution concept. Then for any α 0,1 , α 0,2 , δ 0,1,2 , and δ 0,2,1 , the predictions about outcomes (0, 0) and (1, 1) depending on the value of v ∈ R 2 can be depicted as in figures 3-4, where a 1 = −α 0,1 , a 2 = −α 0,2 , b 1 = −α 0,1 − (δ 0,1,2 + δ 0,2,1 ), and b 2 = −α 0,2 − (δ 0,1,2 + δ 0,2,1 ).
Case 3. Suppose that agents are playing rationalizable strategies. Then for any α 0,1 , α 0,2 , δ 0,1,2 , and δ 0,2,1 , the predictions about outcomes (0, 0) and (1, 1) depending on the value of v ∈ R 2 can be depicted as in figures 5-8, where a 1 = −α 0,1 , a 2 = −α 0,2 , Figure 6 . Hence, one might think that rationalizability and "collusive" behavior both can explain the data. However, since in Proposition 5.3(i) I assume that there exist two players such that δ 2 0,i,j = δ 2 0,j,i , the "multiplicity" region under rationalizability is never a square (the lengths of the region are δ 0,1,2 and δ 0,2,1 ). In contrast, under "collusive" behavior the "multiplicity" region is always a square (the lengths of the region are δ 0,1,2 + δ 0,2,1 and δ 0,1,2 + δ 0,2,1 ). Thus by analyzing these two "asymmetric" players I can determine the correct solution concept. If I determined that the correct solution concept is minimax, then at most I can identify α 0,1 + min{δ 0,1 , 0} and α 0,2 + min{δ 0,2 , 0}. If the correct solution concept is "collusive" behavior, then I can pointidentify α 0,1 , α 0,2 , and δ 0,1,2 + δ 0,2,2 . If agents play rationalizable strategies, then I can pointidentify all payoff parameters.
The result then follows from the fact that the choice of players i, j and w ∈ W was arbitrary. 
